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Abstract 
CO2 from coal-fired power generation accounts for 43% of the total emissions in China. The Chinese government has 
constructed an emissions trading market, but the total allotment for the power industry is not be proposed. This raises 
some core issues in the emissions trading market, including how to set the total emissions level and how to distribute 
initial emissions rights. In this report, evolutionary game theory was adopted to set the total emissions control level 
based on the coordination between economy and environment in the development process. This coordination was 
expressed as the ratio between the reduction of electricity volume due to the reduction of one unit emissions and the 
increase of electricity volume due to the increase of one unit emissions. A swarm simulation model based on multi-
agent game theory was proposed, and a simulation example was carried out. After the total emissions standard is set 
by the government, power companies can decide their price, sales and emissions volume as part of electricity market 
and emissions rights market. In this simulation, it was found that, with a decline of total emissions, total electricity 
volume is not monotonically decrease. The change of electricity volume is a dynamic process, in which the electricity 
volume declined initially, and then increased, decreased in the end. The rates of reduction and increase are different, 
which provides a scientific basis to set total emissions volume for the power industry. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introductions 
Gas pollution from coal-fired power generation accounts for 43% of the total emissions in China. 
Based on this, the Chinese government has constructed an emissions trading market [1]. The core issue of 
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emissions trading markets is how to reasonably distribute the initial emission rights [2-4]. To solve the 
problem of the allocation of initial emission rights, the total amount available should first be determined, 
i.e., in the emissions trading market, a reasonable range of the total emission rights should be set. 
In some literature, the total emission volume usually is set according to environmental capacity. 
Example, in the literature [5], a long-term emissions goal was decided according to the environmental 
capacity. In the emissions trading market, each participates is trading according to its initial emissions 
rights. Once a transaction has taken place, the maximal volume will be reset to 80% of its previously 
declared amount. Total emissions will continue to decrease until the total emission standard is reached. In 
literature [6], the total emissions volume is set according to objectives of regional environmental quality. 
The control method for total emissions is irrelevant to the electricity trading system, while in reality, it is 
very important to consider the effect of total emissions on electricity production. A higher standard will 
slow the speed of development of power companies, which will prevent power companies from taking on 
more efficient measures to reduce emissions; thus, overall control standards will not be achieved in the 
end. Similarly, if the standard is lower, power companies will feel it is unnecessary to implement energy 
efficient measures, and there will be a negative impact on the environment [7].
There are two main methods used for allocating initial emission rights [8-11]. One method is distribution 
without charge. The free allocation model of initial emission rights was proposed in literature [12].The 
basic principle is to maximize social welfare. Previous studies have analyzed some of the problems in the 
free distribution mechanism. Shoude and Tongcheng proposed a multi-objective decision-making model 
to set the free allocation of initial emission rights based on the principles of economic optimization, 
fairness and production continuity [13]. The second allocation method is distribution with charge, such as 
auctioning and fixed price sales of emissions rights [14]. The literature [15] found that the allocation with 
charge brings about both higher electricity prices than the output-based allocation which encourages 
producers to be environmentally friendly. Compared with the free distribution, the advantage of the 
auction method is that it can stimulate technological progress and innovation. However, this mechanism 
will reduce the competitiveness of the public sector, and result in total social welfare loss. 
In the present study, a multi-agent game simulation model was constructed based on intelligent agent 
and evolutionary game analysis. Two experiments were designed in the simulation model. The first 
experiment represented an emissions trading market with fixed total emissions. The experiment was 
designed to observe the pricing and output behavior of various power companies in electricity market and 
emissions rights market when the total emissions were given. The experiment studied how to distribute 
the initial emissions rights to each power company using fixed total emissions. The second experiment 
examined a simulation of the electricity and emissions trading markets when there are variations in total 
emissions. The main purpose of this experiment was to observe the pricing and output behavior of various 
power companies in the electricity market and emission rights trading market under the condition of 
variable total emissions. This experiment should help to determine the optimal total emissions and explain 
why the emissions trading market can quickly reach equilibrium. Compared with the methods used in 
literatures [15-16], this paper is more focused on the coordination of economic and environmental factors in 
the development process. The total emissions were determined according to the ratio between the 
reduction of electricity volume due to a reduction of one unit emissions and the increase of electricity 
volume due to an increase of one unit emissions.  
2. Swarm Simulation Model Based on Multi-Agent Game Theory 
In Model, the government’s goal is to coordinate economy and environment, and the power 
companies’ goals are to maximize their gains in electricity market and emissions rights trading market. In 
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the game process, the government determines the total emissions, and then power companies seek the 
optimal production strategy compete with other power companies. 
2.1.  The basic model of power companies and electricity market. 
To analyze the trading strategy of power companies in two markets, the following assumptions for the 
electricity market and power companies are set. Assume the cost function of the i th power company is 
( )i i i i ic q a b q= + .Where, ia  and ib  are the coefficients for the production cost function, and iq  is the 
production. Assume the demand function of the electricity market is ( )p f Q l kQ= = − .Where, l  and k
are the coefficients of the demand function, 
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, where, 
iπ  is the profit of the i th power company; ( )i i ipq c q−  is the profit gained by the i th power company in 
the electricity market; ip  is the market clearing prices; iq  is the sales of the i
th power company in the 
electricity market; , ,( )i w i best ip w w−  is the profit of the i th power company in the emissions trading 
markets; ,i wp  is the transaction price of the i
th power company in emissions rights market; , ,i best i bestw dq=
is the emission rights of the i th power company when the production is optimal; and i iw dq=  is the 
emission rights of the i th power company. 
Initially, the government sets the total emissions standard and distributes emission rights to the power 
companies without charge. 
2.2. Decision making in the electricity market. 
 The power companies determine their price and optimal production according to their emissions rights, 
production costs and existing generating capacity. To determine their buy or sell emissions rights 
according to the existing technology, owned emission rights and optimal capacity. The marginal clearing 
price was adopted in the electricity market; that is, each power company presents its supply and price. To 
in accordance with market demand, the electricity trading center purchases electricity from power 
companies according to price from low to high. The trading price is the market clearing price. 
In the simulation model, each power company is an independent participator with independent 
decision making and adaptive learning abilities. They can adjust their own generating capacity and 
pricing based on the profit-maximizing principle. Its output is ,
1
( 1) / ( ( 1))
n
i best i i
i
q l n b b k n
=
⎛ ⎞= − + + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ . 
The optimal supply of the power company is restricted by the installed capacity and emissions rights; 
therefore, the electricity volume is the minimum value of the three volumes, that is 
( ), , ,maxmin , ,i i w i best iq q q q= .Where, ,maxiq  is the electricity volume with the installed capacity constraints; 
, /i w iq w d=  is the electricity volume with the emissions rights permit; d is emissions volume per kWh; 
and iw is the i
th power company’s emissions rights. The market price is
0
n
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rights purchased and sold by the i th power company are 
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on the profit maximizing principle, the marginal profit of the i th power company is same in both the 
electricity and emissions trading markets. That is, the sale price of the emissions rights of the i th power 
company is 1, ( )
t
i w act ip d p b
− = − .
2.3. Decision making in the emissions trading market.  
If the power company purchases or sells their emissions rights in the emissions trading market, they 
will increase or reduce their supply of electricity and production next game. The high-low matching 
mechanism, also known as matching transactions, was adopted in the emissions trading market [17]. After 
the transactions are completed, the power companies take part in the electricity market. The detailed rules 
of the high-low auction mechanism in the emissions trading markets can be described as follows. 
(1) Used to calculate the price discrepancy between all power companies in purchasing emissions 
rights and all power companies in selling emissions rights is P P P= −i,j,d i,b j,s .Where, Pi,j,d  is price 
discrepancy between the i th and the j th power company; Pi,b  and Pj,s  is the i
th and the j th power 
company’s offer to purchase or sell emissions rights. 
(2) The transaction pairs were ordered by the price discrepancy from high to low. A transaction pair 
will be abandoned if the price discrepancy is negative. 
(3) In accordance with the order, the transaction pairs with the largest price discrepancy will 
participate in the trading. The transaction volume and price between the purchaser and seller will be 
calculated as follows: ① the holding volume, also is called as emission rights waiting for trading, is the 
remaining emissions rights of the power companies, whose price discrepancy is not less than zero, take 
part in trading in the previous game.② the trading price is the arithmetic average of the initial purchase 
price and the sale price of power companies, that is, , / 2
t
i wP P P= i,s j,b（ + ） . 
(4) The transaction price and volume of the next pairs are calculated in accordance with the price 
discrepancy order. If the same price and volume are presented in different transactions, the trading 
volume in the previous round of the game will be deducted from the holding volume, and then traded in 
the present time. If the price and holding volume of the current transaction parts is zero, then the 
transaction is completed.  
(5) If the price discrepancy is the same, the trading volume will be allocated according to the ratio of 
the holding volume.  
(6) When there are no other power companies with holding volume in emissions rights market, the 
power companies will adjust their purchase price and sale price, and then turn to the electricity market.  
When the market reaches equilibrium, the total emissions will be adjusted once again, and a new 
round transaction will be started. 
3. Simulation  
Assumed the demand function of electricity market is 1.5986 0.0055d dP Q= −  in the experiment. Each 
power company's installed capacity and the coefficients of cost function are given in Table 1. The step 
size to adjust the total emissions is 0.05wΔ = . The step size of the power company to adjust the emissions 
rights is 0.1SΔ = . The unit emission volume is 1d = , that is, the emissions volume per unit production is 
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1 g. Two simulation experiments were carried out to observe the clearing process in electricity market and 
emissions right market when the total emissions are fixed or declined steadily with the unit volume. 
In the simulation experiment of the electricity market with fixed total emissions, the following 
conclusions can be discovered by observe the change of trading volume and trading price. (1)When the 
emissions rights can be traded in the emissions trading market, the electricity market will be more 
efficient, the total volume will increase. (2) With the increasing of electricity volume, the trading price in 
the electricity market begins to fall, and the trading price in the emission rights market begins to rise. 
Tab1. Parameters of every power companies 
Power companies Installed capacity Cost coefficient a Cost coefficient b 
PC1 75.4 0.10 0.050 
PC2 16.5 0.15 0.058 
PC3 30.0 0.84 0.057 
PC4 20.0 0.88 0.058 
PC5 44.0 0.89 0.045 
PC6 144.0 0.95 0.060 
PC7 40.6 0.11 0.065 
Some conclusion can be draw by observe the game balancing process and the trading prices of various 
power companies in emissions rights market. (1) In emissions trading market, the emissions rights of 
power companies with high costs (such as the sixth and seventh power company) are sold to the power 
companies with low costs (such as the first, third and fifth power company). (2) The marginal cost of 
power companies is increasing. Because the transaction price in the electricity market is the same, a 
power company with lower production costs will have higher marginal revenue. When the electricity 
market is at equilibrium, the marginal revenue of the power company in the electricity and emissions 
rights market is the same. Therefore, the power company’s offer in the emissions trading market is higher. 
Observe the change process of the total trading volume in the electricity market when the total 
emissions are reduced by one unit. With the reducing of the total emissions in the emissions trading 
market, the trading volume in the electricity market will continuously change. With the total emissions 
decreasing, there is a region of the curve in which the volume will be increased. Why does the trading 
volume increase when the total emissions decrease in some regions? With a reduction of the total 
emissions rights, emissions rights prices will rise, causing some power companies with a high cost to exit 
the market. Therefore, even if the price in emissions rights market rises and some high cost power 
companies exit the market, power companies with low costs will acquire more emission rights and 
produce more electricity with the same price. Thus, the total volume in the market will rise. 
Observe the total trading volume in the emissions market when the total emissions are reduced. The 
total trading volume in emissions rights market will increase at first and then decrease when the total 
emissions decline. Initially, when the sales of power companies are larger than the volume purchases, the 
market will be at a stage where supply exceeds demand; therefore, the trading volume decreases. With the 
reduction of total emissions rights, the sales of power companies will be the same as the purchases; thus, 
the market supply and demand will be in a relatively balanced stage and the total trading price will 
increase. However, when the total emissions are further reduced, the sales of the power companies who 
purchase emission rights will increases, while it decreases for the volume sold; thus, the market supply is 
less than the demand, and the volume will also decrease. 
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4. Conclusion 
After we studied the simulation process of power companies in electricity market and emission right 
market, the following conclusions can be draw: (1) in emissions trading mechanisms, the supply and 
demand of emissions rights will be relatively balanced by controlling the total emissions. However, once 
transactions take place, the market will immediately come to a clearing state, and transactions will 
become rare. With technological innovation and progress, there will be some surplus of emissions rights, 
or new power companies will enter the emissions trading market, and new trading will occur. However, 
equilibrium can be achieved very quickly if an emissions trading boom in the market is related to the 
development of emission reduction technology. In turn, emissions trading mechanisms can incentivize the 
power company to adopt new emissions reduction technologies. (2) Emissions trading mechanisms with 
the fixed total emissions are characterized by several critical points. If total emissions standard is less than 
the critical point, then the economic loss ratio for reducing one unit emissions is greater than the 
economic benefit ratio for increasing one unit emissions. At this point, if the emissions standard is further 
reduced, excessive incentive will be generated, the total society welfare will be reduced. The critical point 
is a reference value for the total emissions standard. (3) For a given total emissions standard, the 
emissions rights owned by power companies when the volume is at its highest in the electricity market 
can be use as the initial emission rights. In a competitive market, the market price will be the lowest, and 
the total society welfare also is the greatest when the volume is at its maximum. 
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